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Providing new evidence derived from a large sample simulation using US exchange-listed firms 
from 1990 to 2012, this paper contributes to the discussion about 1) the magnitude of target pre-
bid abnormal returns (conventionally called the “run-ups”) and 2) the substitution and mark-up 
pricing relation between pre-bid run-ups and post-bid mark-ups of M&A targets. As random 
simulation represents the normal scenario (i.e. probability of M&A announcement is 
unpredictable), we should consider empirically derived critical values of simulation run-ups as 
the new benchmarks when testing the significance of the target’s pre-bid abnormal return. The 
fact that only 13% of M&A run-ups could be recognized as abnormal when compared to new 
benchmarks raises doubts about the traditional approach. In the examination of the relationship 
between run-ups and mark-ups, a 0.4674 coefficient in the regression of mark-up on run-up using 
pure random sample makes significant contribution to the debate upon substitution and mark-up 
pricing hypotheses. If we take 0.4674 as a baseline, the coefficient of the regression is supposed 
to be smaller if substitution hypothesis outweighs mark-up pricing hypothesis, otherwise this 
coefficient will be larger than 0.4674. Although the conclusion is still open, findings in this paper 
and in Schwert (1996) actually tend to support the substitution hypothesis instead of mark-up 
pricing hypothesis, suggesting pre-bid run-ups do not necessarily cause a higher bidding price for 
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In the pre-bid stage, it is quite common for the bidding firms to experience great 
exposures to target stock price volatility. Since evaluation process for the target firm 
still goes on, the offer price is very sensitive to abnormal movements of target stock 
price during this stage. Thus, it is not surprising that target pre-bid abnormal returns 
have caused a widely discussion in the literature. 
Schwert (1996) suggests a scenario which has been played out frequently in real life – 
the target stock price soars (the run-ups) before the bidding firm announce its offer, 
and thus the bidding firm faces a difficult situation where it has to decide whether to go 
ahead with its planned offer (ignore the run-ups), or to revise its bidding price by 
taking into account the increase of target stock price (which might indicate an increase 
of target’s stand-alone value, and/or a potential contesting bidder).  That being said, 
after examination using empirical data of exchange-listed targets from 1975 to 1991, 
pre-bid run-up of 13.3% and post-bid mark-up of 10.1% were reported in his study. 
Moreover, it has been documented that, comparing with a single bidder scenario, an 
auction is associated with an added takeover premium of 11.4% (Comment & Schwert, 
1995), or even as high as 13% (Bradley, Desai, & Han Kim, 1988). In the latter case, 
pre-bid run-ups play an extremely important role in the construction of bidding cost. 
To further examine the empirical relation between pre-bid run-ups and post-bid mark-
ups, this paper uses a large random simulation sample as the comparison group, 
representing the “norm” of this real universe. It sets up an unconditional scenario that 
1) helps us understand better how big the pre-bid run-up is and 2) contributes to the 
interpretation of relation between run-ups and mark-ups. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature and the 
two competing hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data selection process, simulation 
construction process, and event study method applied in this paper. In Section 4, the 
event study results of the simulation samples are discussed. Analysis of the regression 
tests with related to pre-bid run-ups and post-bid mark-ups can be found in Section 5, 
and in Section 6 robustness tests have been conducted for the regression analysis. 




2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Target Pre-bid Run-ups 
To clearly define the two periods of interest, I follow previous studies and use pre-bid 
run-ups to represent the target abnormal return before first bid announcement. During 
this period, the market does not generally have information about potential bidder (s), 
and it is likely that the bidder knows very little with their rivals as well. After the first 
bid announcement occurs, the target and the bidder are in a public negotiation game 
where a rival bidder may emerge, leading to a higher premium paid by the winning 
bidder. Abnormal returns to target during the period from first bid announcement to the 
final outcome of the deal are denoted as the mark-ups. 
Early studies of M&A cases before 1980 observed positive pre-announcement effects 
(Asquith, 1983; Dodd, 1980; Eckbo, 1983) with researchers observing an approximate 
30% abnormal return to the target of tender offers over a period of one month, on 
average, before and after the announcement day (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1983; 
Bradley, 1980; Jarrell & Bradley, 1980). Later, Jarrell & Poulsen (Jarrell & Poulsen, 
1989) found target shareholders in 526 bids from 1963-1986 received an average 
premium of 28.99% (CAR) over a period of [-20, +10]. 
Recent studies also recorded significant target pre-bid run-ups (Borges & Gairifo, 
2013); King, 2009; Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn, 2008; Schwert, 1996), and discussed 
questions about how big the pre-bid run-ups are, what causes the run-ups, and how do 
they affect the control premium paid by bidding firms. Following their discussion, this 
paper focuses on the last question and further contributes to the existing literature by 
using a comparison group constructed by large sample random simulations to evaluate 
the unconditional relationship between run-ups and mark-ups. 
 
2.2. Substitution and Markup Pricing Hypotheses 
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Among the extensive discussions on bidders paying large premiums to acquire control 
of exchange-listed firms, it is conventionally considered that the premium consists of 
the abnormal returns earned by target shareholders, including a period of pre-bid run-
up and a period of post-bid mark-up of target stock price.  
Following Schwert (Schwert, 1996), a simple formula can be used to demonstrate the 
relation between run-ups and mark-ups: 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝.   
Under the semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (FAMA, 1970), the 
market price reflects all public information. Provided that the target stock price rises on 
the announcement day, drops if the bid is not successful, and the outcome of a deal 
cannot be predicted (without private information), it is not possible to profit by buying 
target stocks on the offer announcement day (Bradley et al., 1983). In this case, most 
market investors are unable to earn significant abnormal returns without access to 
private information. Therefore, according to this theory, pre-bid run-ups and post-bid 
mark-ups should be uncorrelated under a normal scenario where there is no insider 
trading (they are merely “random walk” of target stock price) since price movement is 
unpredictable.   
Not surprisingly, during a two-party negotiation, both bidder and the target usually 
have more private information than the market does due to information asymmetry and 
delayed price discovery process. They will choose to ignore the price run-ups if they 
are sure that the run-ups are caused by the leakage of their private information (i.e. 
insider trading) and thus the market price cannot reveal any new information to them. 
It is possible that post-bid mark-up decreases just after the pre-bid run-up goes up, as 
Schwert (1996) puts it, “each dollar of pre-bid run-ups offsets the post-bid mark-up 
one for one”, and this theory is denoted as Substitution Hypothesis.  
However, in most cases, both bidder and target are not sure whether run-ups also 
represent new private information held by other traders, or potential bidders (i.e. 
potential bidders may purchase target stock in the market). Thus it is consistent with 
the rational behavior of both bidder and target that they should update their evaluations 
for the target. The fact that bid premiums in M&A auctions are higher than those paid 
cases involving only one bidder provides support for this Markup Pricing Hypothesis: 
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the final deal price increases due to pre-bid run-ups, and each dollar of pre-bid run-up 




In order to make my study comparable with previous studies, I follow most of the 
sample firm selection requirements in Schwert (1996) and Betton et al. (2008) for 
choosing US M&A target sample; data in the simulation samples should meet the same 
criteria as those in M&A sample where the criteria are applicable. 
 
3.1. Sample Data Selection 
The initial M&A sample contains all the US targets traded on NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ in the bids collected by Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum if 1) the bid is with 
a deal type “merger” or “acquisition of majority interest” (transaction form “M” and 
“AM”), 2) the buyer owns at least 50% of the target equity after the deal, 3) disclosed 
value merger & acquisitions, 4) over the period of Jan 1st 1990 to Dec 31st 2012. An 
initial sample of 7,745 deals has been obtained. 
As to simulation samples, I first choose all the US domestic companies listed on 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ between Jan 1st 1990 to Dec 31st 2012 as the original 
company sample, resulting in 20,342 companies in total. For each company, I pair it 
with each calendar day (denoted as the “pseudo” event day in this paper) from Jan 1st 
1990 to Dec 31st 2012, which includes 8,401 calendar days in total. After combining 
each company with each calendar day, we get a simulation pool with full combinations 
of all the companies and dates. 
Moreover, all the companies in the M&A sample and the simulation pool are also 
required to satisfy the following criteria: 
(1) A stock price exceeding $1 over day-42 to day -1  
(2) A total market equity capitalization exceeding $10 million on day -42 
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(3) Have at least 100 days of common stock return data in CRSP over the 
estimation period [-297, -43] 
 
The sample cleaning process and observations included in the study at each are 
summarised Table 1. To clean the simulation pool, I first drop those combinations 
whose pseudo event day is not between the listing and delisting day of the firm (in 
other words, the stock does not trade on the stock exchange on that day), resulting in 
62,121,172 combinations retained in the pool. After screening it using Condition (1) 
and (2) listed above, the final simulation pool includes 50,366,878 firm-date 
observations.  
 
Table 1. Sample Cleaning Process and Sample Size 
Simulation Pool N 
Initial Pool of Firm and Date Combination 170,893,142 
Event Date Matches Listing Day          62,121,172 
A stock price exceeding $1  53,397,611 
A total market equity capitalization exceeding $10 million on day -42 
Have at least 100 days of common stock return data in CRSP over the 
estimation period (day -297 to day -43) 
50,366,878 
 
         46,718,352 
Final Pool Size 46,718,352 
M&A Sample N 
Initial M&A Pool 7,745 
CUISIP Transfer to PERMNO on CRSP 6,733 
A stock price exceeding $1  5,805 
A total market equity capitalization exceeding $10 million on day -42 4,367 
Have at least 100 days of common stock return data in CRSP over the 
estimation period (day -297 to day -43) 
4,171 
Final Sample Size 4,171 
 
 
3.2. Simulation Construction 
As mentioned in the previous section, the simulation pool is composed of all the 
possible combinations of firms and calendar days from 1990 – 2012, and, for each 
combination, the pseudo event day should be within the listing day and delisting day of 
a firm on its stock exchange. For example, the combination with a pseudo event day 
that lies before the IPO day (or after the delisting day) of the firm will be excluded. 
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The rationale behind this methodology is similar with the simulation construction 
method used by (Kothari & Warner, 1997) in their study on long-horizon security price 
performance.  
With the cleaned pool, a cross-sectional daily event study has been conducted for each 
combination in the pool over a pre-bid event window of [-42,-1] and a post-bid event 
window of [0, +126 or delisting day], which results in 46,718,352 CAR run-ups and 
mark-ups pairs (combinations that do not satisfy Condition (3) listed above have been 
excluded from the sample). The simulation samples are then generated from this pool 
of firm and date combinations using both simple random selection and time stratified 
selection methods. 
The advantages of this sample construction method is that the pool is representative of 
the unconditional population which contains all the takeover targets and non-takeover 
firms. By investigating the stock response to pseudo announcements, or “events”, we 
observe the unconditional level of “abnormal returns” to these firms. 
When compared to the pre-bid run-ups of the M&A sample, the simulation sample 
suffers less in terms of time contamination, or overlapping of event windows, while 
conducting regression analysis. 
 
3.2.1. Simple Random Selection Method 
Simple random selection method simply selects 𝑛 firm-date combinations from the 
simulation pool (𝑛 equals the size of M&A sample, here 𝑛 = 4171) without any other 
considerations. Each combination has an equal opportunity to be chosen for the 
sample. This sample of 4171 observations is called a run. The process is replicated 
10,000 times, resulting in a pure random simulation sample of 10,000 runs.  
Many studies used a matched sample as the comparison group while conducting event 
study. Datta et al. (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2001) select the control firm from 
pool of firms listed on the same stock exchange if it satisfies the following condition: 
the sum of the absolute percentage differences between the size, book-to-market ratio, 
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and pre-acquisition price run-up of the sample firm and the matched firm is minimized. 
This method controls for the specific characteristics of comparable firm, however, it 
suffers in cross-section effects between the sampled firms. For example, their study 
results might be contaminated by a rival firm announcement effect (Song & Walkling, 
2000a) due to the usage of similar firm characteristics and the exact same time period.  
Comparing to a matched sample, a pure random sample (i.e. randomly chosen firms 
listed on the same stock exchange, randomly chosen pseudo event days from 8041 
calendar days) could simulate a more realistic universe which we observe in real life. 
On another note, oversampling of a certain firm due to replacement should be offset 
across the 10,000 simulation runs, so the simulation sample will produce a 
representative sample of actual returns to the firms. 
 
3.2.2. Time Stratified Random Selection Method 
As my sample period covers the fifth merger wave from 1994 to 2001, which is driven 
by market roll-ups, it is inevitable that certain time period is associated with many 
consolidating deals. Additionally, tech bubble recession taking place around 2000 and 
subordinate crisis in 2008 are also included in the sample period, leading to strong 
M&A deal clustering effects. Hence, in order to capture time concentration effect of 
the takeover deals, a time stratified random selection method is conducted to randomly 
select combinations from the pool according to the proportions of M&A deals taken 
place in each year.  
Figure 1 shows the weight for each year across the whole sample time period. As we 
observe, 38% of M&A deals take place during the five-year window of 1997 to 2001, 
and 17% of M&A deals are clustered in another three-year period from 2006 to 2008. 
Since major corporate events cluster through time by industry, there is an extensive 
accounting literature documenting cross-sectional dependence of individual-firm 
residuals (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000). Although we are taking risks of including 
potential contaminations in a pure random scenario when adding the time cluster effect 
into the simulation, two aspects of methodologies mediate the downside: 1) the random 
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selection approach limits industry clustering effect (i.e. each firm-date combination in 
the same year has equal opportunity to be chosen); 2) relatively short event study 
window reduces time overlap of individual abnormal returns in the same run. 
Therefore, the advantage of constructing a time stratified random sample outweighs the 
risks we take in this study.  
 
Figure 1. Time Concentration for M&A deals from 1990 to 20121 
 
 
3.3. Event Study Methodology 
Standard event study methodology event study methods suggested by MacKinlay 
(MacKinlay, 1997) has been applied in this study, Cross-Sectional event study for each 
firm over specified time window is conducted to further examine the magnitude of  
run-ups and mark-ups. I use Eventus to conduct event studies for both real M&A 
announcement events and pseudo events in the simulation runs.  
Abnormal returns are computed using the following equation: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡                (1) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is return for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the return to the CRSP value-weighted 
index, 𝛼𝑖and 𝛽𝑖 are market model parameter estimates from Day 297 through Day 43 
                                                             






























































































prior to the announcement date (or the pseudo announcement date). For each acquiring 
firm, the cumulative abnormal return is computed as the sum of its abnormal returns 
during each event window. Following previous studies, event windows for computing 
pre-bid run-ups and post-bid mark-ups are day [-42, -1] and day [0, +126 or delisting 
day], respectively.   
 
4. Pre-bid Run-ups Analysis 
 
4.1. How Big is the Run-up 
First, standard daily event study has been conducted to investigate the magnitude of 
pre-bid run-ups in our M&A sample. Since we focus on the pre-bid period, only daily 
average abnormal returns (AAR) during day [-42,-1] are listed in Table 2. Significance 
tests are conducted for each daily AAR (PATELL, 1976).  First impression from the 
standard event study shows that, starting on day -40, the targets start to obtain 
significant abnormal returns. Although significantly different from zero, the observed 
daily AARs of target stock price remain relatively small in magnitude with a value of 
7.68% over day [-42, -1], as comparing to the huge jump of 15.38% on the event day 
only. Accordingly, mark-up hits a significant cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) of 21.65%. These findings are in accord with previous researches in the 1980s 
or earlier. Nevertheless, the magnitude of run-up seems less exciting than that has been 
recorded by Schwert (1996). For instance, different from his conclusion drawn from an 
M&A sample covering the time period between 1975 to 1991 (Schwert, 1996) that 
50% of control premium is consisted of pre-bid run-ups, here we only observe a run-up 
accounting for 26% of the total premium. 
To further investigate pre-bid run-ups of each firm over an event window of day [-42,-
1], I also conduct cross-sectional event study to analyze the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) of the targets one by one. Results of the cross-sectional event study for 
takeover announcement indicate a large cumulative abnormal return with a mean of 




Table 2. Abnormal Return for M&A Sample 
Day AAR Positive : Negative Patell Z Cumulative AAR 
-42 0.05% 2043:2237 1.316$ 0.05% 
-41 -0.01% 1987:2293 -0.550 -0.01% 
-40 0.12% 2046:2234 2.911** 0.11% 
-30 0.05% 2049:2231 0.333 0.68% 
-20 0.16% 2067:2213 3.459*** 1.58% 
-15 0.16% 2094:2186 3.519*** 2.24% 
-14 0.12% 2056:2224 1.459$ 2.36% 
-13 0.20% 2131:2148 4.146*** 2.56% 
-12 0.20% 2092:2188 3.582*** 2.76% 
-11 0.26% 2106:2174 3.951*** 3.02% 
-10 0.19% 2108:2172 3.603*** 3.21% 
-9 0.19% 2080:2200 3.422*** 3.40% 
-8 0.21% 2113:2167 3.640*** 3.61% 
-7 0.32% 2138:2142 5.993*** 3.93% 
-6 0.36% 2155:2125 7.124*** 4.29% 
-5 0.36% 2195:2085 7.084*** 4.65% 
-4 0.46% 2226:2054 9.716*** 5.11% 
-3 0.49% 2204:2076 10.791*** 5.60% 
-2 0.77% 2270:2010 15.127*** 6.37% 
-1 1.31% 2427:1850 27.344*** 7.68% 
0 15.36% 3378:899 359.146*** 23.04% 
1 5.85% 2592:1685   137.907*** 28.89% 
126 0.06%   663:720     0.473    29.33% 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 
0.001 levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 














































4.2. Mean/Median CARs for Each Simulation Run 
As stated above, the mean and the median of CARs for M&A sample (namely 7.4% 
and 5.1%, see Table 3) are significantly positive, and also very close to its 7.68% 
cumulative average abnormal return under standard event study method (see Section 
4.1). It consists with findings in Franks and Harris (1989) that there is 8.4% CAR over 
the 4 months before M&A announcement. However, an average cumulative run-up of 
13.3% has been recorded in the research of Schwert (1996), while Betton, Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2008) found an average target run-up of 8.3% over day [-42, -1] during 
1980 – 2002 using a sample similar to the that used in this study. These evidences have 
manifested the dispersions on the magnitude of pre-bid run-up over time. 
Instead of a zero average mean (median) as we expect, in Figure 3 and Table 3 we 
could observe a negative average value of -0.0102 for means of CARs crossing 10,000 
simulation runs derived from pure random simulation sample (-0.0098 for time 
stratified simulation sample). This finding seems to suggest that investors, on average, 
are losing money over the 23-year horizon. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency of Means (and Medians) of Each Simulation Run2  
 
                                                             
2 To make the figure easier to observe, the 10,000  means (medians) of simulation runs have been 




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Average of Mean CARs for Simulation Run 
















Avg. of Mean CARs 
from Each Run 
10000 -0.0102 -0.0047 0.0033 -0.0098 0.0035 -0.0041 
  (-3.0944**)   (-2.7980**)   
Avg. of Median 
CARs from Each Run 
10000 -0.0068 -0.0035 0.0021 -0.0068 0.0021 -0.0033 
  (-3.2902**)   (-3.1830**)   
Mean CAR for M&A 4171 0.0740  0.2422    
  (19.7218***)      
Median CAR for 
M&A 
4171 0.0505  0.2422    
    (<.0001***)           
Test for Null Hypothesis: Mu0=0 using population std. deviation, to calculate t-stat using sample std. deviation, simply 
times t-stat in parenthesis by √𝑁=100; 
 Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1]; 
 Student's t Test for Mean (T-Stat), Signed Rank Test for Median (P-Value);  
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively; 
using a two-tail test.  
 
 
It is necessary to point out that, for the average of 10,000 mean (median) CARs, t-
statistic calculated using sample standard deviation is unusually big due to its large 
sample size (Table 3). It has been noticed that, p-values go quickly to zero in very 
large samples, and could even make minuscule effects become statistically significant 
(Lin, Lucas Jr., & Shmueli, 2013; Schervish, 1990). Here I use the population standard 
deviation to recalculate the t-statistic for simulation samples. Adjusted t-statistics (in 
parenthesis) are still significant at 5% level, suggesting no strong evidence for bias in 
the results. To get unadjusted t-statistic, simply times them by √𝑁  (here 𝑁 = 10,000). 
In order to find possible explanations for the negative average means (medians) of the 
simulation CARs, a good understanding of the market is indispensable. Since the 
Value-Weighted CRSP Market Index (combined NYSE, AMEXT, NASDAQ, and 
ARCA exchanges) is used in the cross-sectional event study, we expect to have a big 
picture of the market trend in this period by analyzing market index returns. Therefore, 
I checked the CRSP value-weighted (include dividends) monthly market returns from 
Jan 1990 to Dec 2012. As shown in Table 5, although 37.68% of the months have 
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negative returns, the average market return crossing 23 years hits a positive 0.008 
which is small in magnitude but significantly different from zero. 
 
 
Table 4. CRSP Value-Weighted Market Returns during 1990-2012 
























No. of Months 276 
Avg. Market Return 0.0080 
Median Market Return 0.0134 
% Negative 0.3768 
Std. Deviation 0.0449 





Figure 4. Value-Weighted Return including dividends 
 
 
Major stock price movements caused by the dot.com bubble crashing around 2000 and 
the subordinate crisis in 2008 are clearly displayed in Figure 4. Each of the two crises 
alone has brought huge negative impact to the market (-0.0343 and -0.371, 
respectively).  
There are three possible explanations for the negative CAR means (medians), on 
average, across 10,000 simulation runs. First of all, we need to understand that the 
random selection method includes all the 276 months, thus it loses any effects of 
variation through time despite due to the large sample size it has. It is not unexpected 
that event study for exchange-listed firms scattered all over in different time periods 
(with replacement) results in an average CAR mean (median) that is slightly different 
from the market trend. A good example can be found is that, after considering time 
concentration effect of M&A deals (i.e. their influence on the market return), time 
stratified sample outputs a less negative average CAR mean (median), which is more 
close to zero.  
Secondly, the sample used in this paper does not include firms trading on Arca Stock 
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Finally, we have to take firm size into account. Since our sample excludes all the 
companies with a market cap smaller than 10 million dollars on the day of -42, and that 
smaller firms have higher risk adjusted returns, on average, than larger firms (Banz, 
1981), it is possible that the market outperforms the simulation sample for about 1%.    
 
4.3. Examination of Pre-bid Run-up at Selected Percentiles 
Comparison between the cross-sectional cumulative abnormal return of the M&A 
sample and the simulation sample will cast lights on how big the problem is for real 
pre-bid run-ups. 
To be more specific, the purpose of my comparison study is to find direct evidence of 
the true target pre-bid run-ups, especially after considering the magnitude of pseudo 
run-ups, or “normal” stock price volatility level generated from a pure random 
simulation.  
While conducting the cross-sectional event study for each takeover target over the 
period of day [-42,-1], I captured pre-bid target price increases which have been 
documented in many researches. Following the method used by Fama & French 
(2010), with a few modifications, I divided this cross-section cumulative abnormal 
return into percentiles and ordered it into a probability distribution function (PDF) 
according to the frequency and the magnitude of the run-up CARs.  
Approach applied to divide the percentiles is described below (Definition 3 in SAS 
system3): 
Let 𝑛 equals the number of nonmissing values for a variable, and let x1, x2... xn 
represent the ordered values of the process variable. For the t  th percentile, set p =
t/100, and express 𝑛p as 
𝑛p = j + g  
                                                             




Where j is the integer part of 𝑛p, and g is the fractional part of 𝑛p. 
The tth percentile (call it y), using the empirical distribution function, is defined in the 
following way.  
{
𝑦 = 𝑋𝑗,                 𝑖𝑓 𝑔 = 0
𝑦 = 𝑋𝑗 + 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑔 > 0
 
Following this method, similar PDFs can be generated for the pseudo CARs of each 
simulation run at selected percentiles. Thus, a distribution of the averages at selected 
percentiles across 10,000 simulation runs could be obtained by us for comparison 
study. 
In my initial investigation, I compare the values of CAR [-42,-1] at selected percentiles 
of the PDF from real takeover sample and the averages across 10,000 simulation runs 
at the same percentiles. 
Furthermore, I constructed the standardized CAR for both M&A sample and the two 
simulation samples. The comparison using standardized CAR between the three 
samples will reflect more information having variance under control. 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to firm 𝑗 over event period 𝑡 is 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1  , where 𝑇1 (𝑇2) denotes the beginning (ending) day of the event window. 
The Standardized CAR is defined as:  
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡⁄  
Where 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡  is the standard deviation of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 , and each 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 follows a student’s t 
distribution under the null hypothesis that each 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 has a mean of zero and variance 
of 𝑆2𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 . 
The initial examination for the probability distributions of CAR derived from different 
samples seems very interesting (see Table 5). An average simulation 95th percentile 
CAR of 0.3172 is, in fact, larger than 90% of CARs in real M&A case; on the other 
hand, less than 3% of real M&A CARs are smaller than the first 5% of the average 
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simulation CARs. All these empirical findings cast doubts on the significance of real 
M&A CARs when they are compared with simulation ones.  
If we imagine the empirical distribution of random simulation CARs as the population 
distribution, or a huge “background” where we mix both noises (abnormal returns 
involved with private information) and market portfolio movements (i.e. macro-
economic movements), it is not farfetched to reason that, as comparing to a simple 
benchmark of zero, this empirical distribution is much closer to our real-life scenario. 
Moreover, it could help us to draw valuable inferences for the discussion on the 
magnitude of pre-bid run-ups.  
That being said, instead of only testing null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  0, I also conduct a 
two-sided test using empirically derived critical values for the real M&A CARs (use 
average simulation 5th CAR of -0.3463 as critical value for the M&A CARs with 
negative signs, whereas average simulation 95th CAR of 0.3172 is used for the M&A 
CARs with positive signs). Table 5 displays critical percentiles of CARs for the three 
samples, results from traditional t-test for M&A CAR at each percentile, and the t-
statistics for comparison between empirically derived critical values and M&A CARs. 
Also, I report the proportion of 10,000 simulation CARs at 5th (95th) percentile that are 
larger (smaller) than M&A CAR at selected percentiles. Note that only when the t-
statistics derived from t-tests with null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 5
𝑡ℎ(95𝑡ℎ)𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢 >
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴, where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 < 0 (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 > 0) are significant with corresponding signs 
could we consider M&A CAR at selected percentile is smaller (larger) than the average 
simulation 5th (95th) percentile. For example, for the M&A CAR at 1st percentile with a 





 should be 
positively significant if null hypothesis is accepted; on the contrary, for the M&A CAR 
at 90th percentile with a positive sign, t-statistic should be negatively significant when 
we reject the null hypothesis that average 95th simulation CAR is larger than the 
selected M&A CAR, and accept the alternative hypothesis that selected M&A CAR is 
larger than the average 95th simulation CAR.
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Table 5. Pseudo vs. Real Target Pre-bid Run-ups at Selected Percentiles (across 10, 000 Runs) 
M&A, Pure Random, and Time Stratified Random list the CARs from each sample at 100 percentiles. T-stat (H0: M&A CAR=0) displays the t-statistics for t-test with null 
hypothesis of 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 = 0 for the M&A CAR at each percentile. vs 5th (95th) Percentile  of Simulation compares M&A CAR at selected percentile with average simulation 
CAR at 5th (95th) percentile if M&A CAR has a negative sign (positive sign). <% 5th or > % 95th Pure Random denotes the proportion of 10,000 simulation CARs at 5th 
percentile that are larger than M&A CAR at selected percentile, or proportion of 10,000 simulation CARs at 95th percentile that are smaller than M&A CAR at selected percentile. 
T-stat (H0: Simu 5th (95th) >M&A) denotes the t-statistics from t-tests with null hypothesis of 𝐻0: 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 5
𝑡ℎ(95𝑡ℎ)𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢 > 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴, where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 <
0 (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 > 0), standard deviation used for tests involving with average simulation 5
th CAR is 𝜎 = √
1
10,000
∑ (𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢 𝑃𝑐𝑡5𝑖 − 𝜇)2
10,000






Same formula applies when calculating standard deviation used for tests with average simulation 95th CAR. Note that population std. deviation is used while calculating T-stat 







vs 5th  (95th) 
Percentile  
Pure Random 









vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile  Time 
Stratified Random 






pct1 -0.5360 -142.9631*** -0.6436 < 100.00 6.4036*** -0.6661 < 100.00 5.6624*** 
pct2 -0.4315 -115.0809*** -0.5098 < 100.00 4.2944*** -0.5260 < 100.00 3.6386*** 
pct3 -0.3499 -93.3298*** -0.4366 < 63.06 0.2324 -0.4485 > 32.20 -0.3371 
pct4 -0.2983 -79.5741*** -0.3851 > 0.00 -3.7138 -0.3960 > 0.00 -4.0886 
pct5 -0.2633 -70.2375*** -0.3463 > 0.00 -7.4409 -0.3555 > 0.00 -7.7163 
pct10 -0.1710 -45.5977*** -0.2338 > 0.00 -25.0097 -0.2384 > 0.00 -24.8557 
pct20 -0.0804 -21.4410*** -0.1309 > 0.00 -62.4764 -0.1325 > 0.00 -62.0427 
pct30 -0.0293 -7.8134*** -0.0754 > 0.00 -102.8317 -0.0759 > 0.00 -102.2696 
pct40 0.0088 2.3406** -0.0371 < 0.00 125.3989 -0.0372 < 0.00 124.3009 
pct50 0.0505 13.4822*** -0.0069 < 0.00 128.6262 -0.0068 < 0.00 129.4243 
pct60 0.0951 25.3531*** 0.0211 < 0.00 100.3534 0.0213 < 0.00 101.2549 
pct70 0.1492 39.8090*** 0.0558 < 0.00 59.5741 0.0566 < 0.00 60.2363 
pct80 0.2302 61.4051*** 0.1076 < 0.00 21.9150 0.1096 < 0.00 23.0128 
pct90 0.3525 94.0096*** 0.2062 > 99.87 -5.1668*** 0.2111 > 98.56 -3.5608*** 
pct95 0.4837 129.0084*** 0.3172 > 100.00 -14.8066*** 0.3266 > 100.00 -13.3167*** 
pct96 0.5302 141.4281*** 0.3559 > 100.00 -16.2447*** 0.3669 > 100.00 -14.7649*** 
pct97 0.5753 153.4597*** 0.4079 > 100.00 -16.1813*** 0.4197 > 100.00 -14.7606*** 
pct98 0.6549 174.6775*** 0.4833 > 100.00 -16.1437*** 0.5007 > 100.00 -14.6107*** 
pct99 0.7796 207.9424*** 0.6265 > 100.00 -14.2537*** 0.6523 > 100.00 -12.9278*** 




Table 5 Continued. Standard Pseudo Target Pre-bid Run-ups at Selected Percentiles (across 10, 000 Runs) 
 
                                      Standard CAR is defined as 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡⁄ ; 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1]; 
                            The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test. 
                                      Find CARs and tests for all percentiles in Table 16, 17 (See Appendix) 
                     
                                                             
4 Denotes the difference between Std. M&A and Std. Pure Random. 




M&A vs 5th 
(95th) Percentile  




M&A vs 5th 
(95th) Percentile  
of Simulation 2 
pct1 -1.7412 -2.1881 0.4469 < -2.1378 < 
pct2 -1.4016 -1.7330 0.3314 < -1.6883 < 
pct3 -1.1367 -1.4844 0.3477 > -1.4395 > 
pct4 -0.9692 -1.3090 0.3398 > -1.2712 > 
pct5 -0.8554 -1.1773 0.3219 > -1.1410 > 
pct10 -0.5554 -0.7949 0.2396 > -0.7652 > 
pct20 -0.2611 -0.4451 0.1839 > -0.4254 > 
pct30 -0.0952 -0.2564 0.1612 > -0.2436 > 
pct40 0.0285 -0.1260 0.1545 < -0.1194 < 
pct50 0.1642 -0.0233 0.1875 < -0.0218 < 
pct60 0.3088 0.0717 0.2371 < 0.0684 < 
pct70 0.4848 0.1898 0.2951 < 0.1817 < 
pct80 0.7479 0.3659 0.3820 < 0.3519 < 
pct90 1.1450 0.7010 0.4439 > 0.6774 > 
pct95 1.5712 1.0784 0.4929 > 1.0484 > 
pct96 1.7225 1.2101 0.5124 > 1.1776 > 
pct97 1.8690 1.3867 0.4823 > 1.3470 > 
pct98 2.1275 1.6431 0.4843 > 1.6071 > 
pct99 2.5326 2.1299 0.4027 > 2.0937 > 
pct100 7.3523 7.6212 -0.2689 > 7.7777 > 
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Also note that I use population standard deviation to calculate t-statistics to mediate the 
effect of large sample size which has been discussed in the previous section; to get 
unadjusted t-statistic, simply times them by √𝑁  (here 𝑁 = 10,000). Back to the 
discussion about the magnitude of M&A run-ups, inferences drawn from the empirically 
derived critical values suggest that only M&A CARs that are smaller than average 5th 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢  (or larger than average 95
th 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢) should be recognized as abnormal. More 
detailed results of comparison for CARs at all the 100 percentiles can be found in Table 
16 in the Appendix. 
According to the empirically derived benchmark, only 13% of CARs in M&A run-up 
distribution (this fraction equals 13% when comparing to Pure Random Simulation, and 
equals 12% when comparing to Time Stratified Random Simulation) fall into the extreme 
areas of the empirical distribution (the upper and the lower 5%).  That is to say, using the 
empirical distribution of pure random simulation CARs as the benchmark, we can 
conclude with 90% confidence that around 13% of real M&A CARs are significantly 
different from the average CAR under the normal scenario, whereas tests for 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅 =
 0 all conclude in rejection of the null hypothesis. This finding brings up a warning signal 
that traditional t-test with benchmark of zero might reject the null hypothesis too often 
(type I error). 
Provided the discussion above, it is necessary for us to reconsider how big the run-up 
should be before we could say they are “abnormal”.  If we use empirical simulation 
distribution as the benchmark, we should have CAR at 5th percentile and that at 95th 
percentile as the two critical values.  In this case, all the run-ups that are smaller than -
0.03463 or larger than 0.3172 will be safely considered to be abnormal.  
Further examination for standard CARs at selected percentiles of all the three samples 
agrees with the previous conclusion I draw. As demonstrated in Table 5, after controlling 
the variance of each sample, 14% of M&A CARs could be considered to be abnormal 
using the standard simulation CAR (pure random sample) distribution as the benchmark. 
This similar result has reinforced the discussion above. 
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Figure 5 implies that distribution of M&A run-ups has horizontally translated towards the 
right, to an extent, indicating there are more above-zero CARs in general, in other words, 
there are more extreme values fall into the right tail. Discussion about the average of 
CAR means in Section 4.2 consists with this deduction as we observe a slight below-zero 
average of CAR means across 10,000 simulation runs whereas a positive average of 
M&A CARs. However, as we could observe from Figure 5, there is an overlap between 
the majority of M&A run-up distribution and random simulation run-up distributions, 
suggesting large proportion of M&A run-ups do not fall beyond the empirically derived 
critical values. 
Concerns about using the empirical distribution of simulated run-ups as testing 
benchmark include 1) random selection approach used in the simulation sample and 2) 
influence of firm specific characteristics.  
First, potential concern about simple random selection method described in Section 3.2.1 
reasons that this method mixes all the firm-date combinations with replacement across 
time, thus it cannot reflect the time concentration effect of M&A deals. This concern has 
been resolved by the time stratified random selection approach. Results of distribution 
generated by time stratified simulation sample in Table 16 and Figure 5 all offer support 
to the conclusion brought by the study using pure random sample. To be more specific, 
only 2% of M&A run-ups are smaller than average 5th CARs of time stratified random 
simulation, and 10% of M&A run-ups are larger than the critical value of average 95th 
CAR, demonstrating an even smaller proportion of M&A run-ups that could be 
recognized as abnormal. This evidence is in accord with my anticipation as the time 
stratified random simulation includes time concentration effect of M&A deals, which is 
reflected in positive stock price movements, making the compared M&A CARs even less 
outstanding.  
Another concern is that firm specific characteristics might have strong influence, thus it 
might not be proper to use simulation samples as a comparison group. To understand the 
reasons for selecting random firm with limited constrains shown in Table 1 (see Section 
3.1), we should first keep in mind that the purpose of constructing the random simulation 
is to mimic an unconditional scenario where mixing all the noises, and this purpose has 
22 
 
been achieved by the approach applied in this paper. On the contrary, another traditional 
method that uses target comparison group suffers from potential contamination caused by 
M&A announcement effect in the same industry. Song & Walkling (2000) found that 
both rival firms and portfolios of rival firms earn significantly positive abnormal returns 
for an initial industry acquisition.  
 
Figure 5. Probability Distribution of Run-ups at Selected Percentiles (across 10,000 Runs) 
 
 
In conclusion, it is suggested by the findings that there is certain advantage for us to 
revise traditional study approach and consider distribution of random simulation run-ups 
as a potential benchmark while studying pre-bid run-ups.  
 
5. Relations between Pre-bid Run-ups and Post-bid Mark-ups 
To answer the question that how pre-bid run-ups affect total control premium, I follow 
Schwert (1996) and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) to examine relation between run-
ups and mark-ups using OLS regression model. Additionally, in this section my study 
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moves forward to the empirical b estimates distribution analysis, and the results provide 
new evidence for the relation between run-ups and mark-ups in a random situation (i.e. 
no predictable M&A announcement is coming on the way). 
While testing the substitution hypothesis and mark-up pricing hypothesis mentioned in 
Section 2, simple linear regression model could be established as: 
 
Premium𝑖 =  a +  b Runup𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                   (2) 
 
Under Substitution Hypothesis, estimate of b equals to zero since pre-bid run-ups have no 
effect on total premium; on the contrary, estimate of b should rounds up to one if Mark-
up Pricing Hypothesis applies because each dollar in the run-ups will add up into the final 
control premium. 
From Schwert’s (Schwert, 1996) formula we could know that 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 +
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝. Equation (1) could therefore be transferred into the following format: 
 
Markup𝑖 =  a + (b − 1) Runup𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖            (3)  
 
Derived from equation (3), equation (4) is simpler and could be used directly for testing 
the two competing hypotheses. 
 
Markup𝑖 =  a +  b Runup𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                     (4) 
 




Substitution Hypothesis: Pre-bid run-ups offset post-bid mark-ups one for one (the 
mark-up is lower by the run-up by the same amount), the coefficient b in regression (4) 
equals -1.  
 
Mark-up Pricing Hypothesis: Pre-bid run-ups increase the final control premium one 
for one, and coefficient b in regression (4) equals 0. 
 
In addition, if coefficient b ranges between -1 and 0, then it is considered to be a partial 
substitution where part of the pre-bid run-ups transfer into the final premium. 
As discussed in Section 2, although Schwert (1996) provided support for the mark-up 
pricing hypothesis with a coefficient of 0.1300 (adjusted to Equation (4) in this paper), 
Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn (2008) observed a different coefficient of 0.5950, which 
implied a strong relation between run-ups and mark-ups. To further study this puzzle, this 
paper replicates regression analysis conducted by the two articles mentioned above, but 
looking through a different perspective – what is the “normal” relation between 
hypothetic run-ups and mark-ups if no predictable event taking place. That is to say, 
whether the relation between run-ups and mark-ups under an M&A scenario is stronger 
than that under the normal scenario. The establishment of empirical benchmark 
representing normal scenario has, in my opinion, major contribution to the debate upon 
substitution hypothesis and mark-up pricing hypothesis. 
5.1. Single Factor Regression 
Two random simulation samples (see Section 3.2) and the M&A sample are examined 
using single-factor OLS model denoted by equation (4).  
I report the average intercept estimates as well as b estimates using data from the 10,000 
simulation runs, and list the average t-statistic in parenthesis. T-test has been conducted 
to testify whether the average coefficient is significantly different from zero. Note that I 
also use population standard deviation to calculate t-statistics here, and unadjusted t-
statistic can be get by simply times them by √𝑁  (here 𝑁 = 10,000).  The percentage of 
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t-statistics that are significant at 5% level is also reported in the following table (Table 6). 
It is more reliable to consider both inferences in order to have a better judgement of the 
significance and explaining power of the coefficient. For example, if more than 95% of 
regression t-statistics for the b coefficient are significantly different from zero, it is safer 
for us to conclude that the run-up is of significant influence on the mark-up. Last but not 
least, a two-sample t-test has been conducted for b coefficients, which is of great 
importance while comparing results between two samples. 
Firstly, I compare the b coefficient from regression using M&A sample with findings in 
previous studies. Similar with the 0.13 (has been adjusted by Equation (4)) in Schwert 
(1996), single factor regression model outputs an estimate of 0.1753, significant at 1% 
level. Only judging from this b coefficient, we will logically accept the mark-up pricing 
hypothesis, just as Schwert (1996) did, as the b coefficient is more close to zero 
comparing to minus one. Under this hypothesis, mark-ups are barely affected by the run-
ups, and the total control premium (denoted as 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝) will 
therefore increase as pre-bid run-ups occur.  
Nevertheless, doubts still exist for this argument: 1) the coefficient is significantly larger 
than zero, which does not apply for the [-1, 0] range suggested by the two competing 
hypotheses; 2) similar study conducted by Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn (2008) has found a 
coefficient of 0.5950, which also mediates the robustness of the conclusion made by 
Schwert (1996).  
As to the b coefficient outputted by regression using random simulation samples, it is 
obvious that average b estimates across 10,000 simulation runs, rounding to 0.4674, is   
significantly larger than the 0.1753 we get from M&A sample. Two-sample t-test with 
null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the mean of b coefficient in 
simulation sample and the b coefficient in M&A sample reports a significant t-statistic in 
Table 6. This makes our discussion quite interesting as 0.4674 represents the “norm” and 
should be used as the baseline in a coordinate system if we intend to test the two 




Table 6. Single Factor Regression Results 
Pure Random and Time Stratified Random represent the regression coefficient from the two simulation samples, which is the average of coefficients across 10,000 runs. % T 
Sig. shows percentage of t-statistics derived from regression in each run that are significant at 5% level using a two-tail test. T-stat (H0: Mu=0) displays results of t-test 
examining whether the corresponding coefficient is significantly different from zero. Note that population std. deviation is used while calculating T-stat (H0: Mu=0), simply 
times them by √𝑁=100 to get t-stats using sample std. deviation. T-stat (H0: MuSimu=MuM&A) presents results from two-sample t-test with a null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the mean of b coefficient in simulation sample and the b coefficient in M&A sample. 
 





T-stat (H0: MuSimu=MuM&A) 
Time Stratified 
Random  






Intercept 10000 -0.0207    -0.019   
  (-2.6985) 87.3 (-3.12**)  (-3.1149) 77.96 (-2.77**)  
CAR [-42,-1] 10000 0.4674    0.4621   
   (14.8176) 100 (6.87***) (429.37***) (15.3901) 100 (6.78***) (421.57***) 
M&A Sample 
Intercept 4171 0.1913 n/a   n/a      
  (29.4757***)        
CAR [-42,-1] 4171 0.1753 n/a   n/a    
   (6.8376***)               
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1]; Mark-ups are estimated over day [0, +126 or delisting day]; 





Figure 6. Suggested Relationship between Run-ups and Mark-ups   
 
As presented by Figure 6, I expect a value of b coefficient larger than the baseline in 
order to offer support for mark-up pricing hypothesis and vice versa. The establishment 
of this coordinate system with new baseline suggest that more discussions should be 
made before we could come to a safe conclusion about the two competing hypotheses. 
 
5.2. Multiple Regression 
To further examine other potential explanatory factors that might have influence on the 
regression model, a multiple OLS regression has been conducted following Equation 5.  
 
Markup𝑖 =  a +  b Runup𝑖 + c 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖             (5) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is the size of the firm, denoted as the logarithm of market capitalization on 
day -42. 
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable representing the stock exchange where the firm lists on: 
it equals 1 when the firm lists on NYSE and AMEX, and equals 0 when the firm lists on 
NASDAQ.  
𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑖 denotes industry characteristics using the first two digits of the four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification code.  
Previous studies have noticed that smaller firms are more likely to become targets 
(Mikkelson & Partch, 1989), and they enjoy higher risk adjusted returns (Banz, 1981). 
From an opposite perspective, it is likely that larger targets have less information 
asymmetry, and it may be more difficult to detect any insider information about larger 
0.4674 
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targets (Brigida & Madura, 2012; Meulbroek, 1992). Therefore, it is expected that 
variable of 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 will have a negative sign for its coefficient. Since this study use a firm 
sample that is mixed across different stock exchanges and industries, I examine the 
potential effect brought by these two factors in order to get a more robust result for 
relation between run-ups and mark-ups. 
From results presented in Table 7 we could safely conclude that, other than the positively 
significant run-ups, only firm size has shown a significantly negative relation with mark-
ups, which consists with the previous expectations that larger firms tend to have lower 
probability of becoming target, less information asymmetry, and they enjoy less positive 
abnormal returns. Additionally, 79% of t-statistics for stock exchange coefficient are 
significant, indicating a weak influence caused by the different characteristics of stock 
exchange. 
More importantly, results exhibit that the two run-up coefficients for pure random sample 
and time stratified random sample are 0.46 and 0.45, respectively. Both b coefficients are 
significant at 1% level. On another note, the b coefficient of 0.1507 for the M&A sample 
is also very close to what we get from single factor regression model. These findings 
indicate that single factor model is of good explanatory power, and using multi-factor 
model does not cause any substantial change for the previous results. 
In order to better understand b estimates for the 10,000 simulation runs, it is necessary to 
investigate empirical b estimate distribution derived from simulation samples. Table 8 
summaries simulation b estimates from both single-factor and multiple regression 
models. Provide that all the simulation b estimates (even b estimate at the 1st percentile) 
are larger than the 0.1753 from M&A single-factor regression in this paper and also the 
0.13 in the study of Schwert (1996), we could therefore agree with the discussion in 
Section 5.1. Moreover, two-sample t-test for the difference of mean between b estimates 
from M&A sample and the two simulation samples all conclude that the relation between 
run-ups and mark-ups under the normal scenario is significantly stronger than that under 




Table 7. Multiple Regression Results 
Pure Random and Time Stratified Random represent regression coefficients from two simulation samples, which average coefficients across 10,000 runs. % T 
Sig. shows percentage of t-statistics derived from regression in each run that are significant at 5% level. T-stat (H0: Mu=0) displays results of t-test examining 
with null hypothesis H0: Mu=0. Note that population std. deviation is used while calculating T-stat (H0: Mu=0), simply times them by √𝑁=100 to get t-stats 
using sample std. deviation. T-stat (H0: MuSimu=MuM&A) presents results from two-sample t-test with a null hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between mean of b coefficient in simulation sample and b coefficient in M&A sample. 
  N 
Pure 
Random  





% T Sig. T-stat (H0: Mu=0) T-stat (H0: 
MuSimu=MuM&A) 
Simulation Runs 
Intercept 10000 0.1853    0.2155       
  (3.6292) 94.17 (3.37***)  (3.9500) 96.97 (3.70 ***)  
CAR [-42,-1] 10000 0.4600    0.4542    
  (15.1658) 100 (6.75***) (453.56***) (14.5837) 100 (6.65***) (444.28***) 
Size 10000 -0.0188    -0.0203    
  (-4.8361) 99.87 (-4.96***)  (-4.9310) 99.89 (-5.08***)  
Stock 
Exchange 
10000 0.0388    0.0388    
  (2.7527) 78.95 (2.81**)  (-2.5991) 74.31 (2.67**)  
Industry 10000 0.0001    -0.0000    
    (0.3832) 8.30 (0.36)   (-0.0603) 6.97 (-0.06)   
M&A Sample 
Intercept 4171 0.6104    n/a     
  (11.03***)        
CAR [-42,-1] 4171 0.1503    n/a    
  (5.86***)        
Size 4171 -0.0298    n/a    
  (-6.91***)        
Stock 
Exchange 
4171 0.0117    n/a    
  (0.76)        
Industry 4171 -0.0010    n/a    
    (-3.09**)             
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1]; Mark-ups are estimated over day [0, +126 or delisting day]; 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.
30 
 
Table 8. b Estimates Distribution at Different Percentiles 








1 0.3190 0.2960 0.3114 0.2887 
5 0.3638 0.3557 0.3555 0.3477 
10 0.3856 0.3797 0.3783 0.3712 
25 0.4220 0.4170 0.4149 0.4092 
50 0.4636 0.4609 0.4561 0.4530 
75 0.5083 0.5041 0.5012 0.4960 
90 0.5528 0.5473 0.5460 0.5402 
95 0.5858 0.5762 0.5786 0.5688 
99 0.6482 0.6340 0.6413 0.6273 
100 0.8361 0.7498 0.8304 0.7419 
 
Another important finding is that simulation b estimate at 95th percentile is very close to 
the 0.5950 cited in the research of Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn (2008). If we use the 
coordinate system suggested in Figure 5 (Section 5.1), findings in Betton, Eckbo & 
Thorburn (2008) implies that mark-up pricing hypothesis outweighs substitution 
hypothesis, whereas results in this paper and in Schwert (1996) suggest an opposite case. 
To sum up, this dispersion may be caused by samples that across different time periods 
and stock exchanges, which will be further discussed in the following section. 
 
5.3. Stock Exchange Specific Effect 
As I mentioned in the previous sections, the sample selection approach in this paper 
follows the majority of criteria used in Schwert (1996) and Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn 
(2008). However, due to the difference in sample time period and/or the stock exchange 
where the firm lists on, we could observe differences in sample size and research results 
in Table 9.  
It seems that b estimate we observe in M&A sample tells us a similar story as Schwert 
(1996) did, whereas findings from Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn (2008) suggest a much 
stronger relation, which might be caused by the time period (1980 – 2002) used in their 
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research covering the 4th and 5th merger waves and two recessions5. These abnormal 
market movements may cause strong autocorrelation over certain time periods.   
Among all the differences in the sample selection criteria, stock exchange may has 
relatively strong influence on sample construction, and it will finally affect the results. 
Therefore, the original simulation pool is divided into two groups – the NYSE & AMEX 
group containing all the firms listing on these two stock exchanges and the NASDAQ 
group accordingly. For each group, I construct Pure Random simulation with 10,000 runs 
follow the approach discussed in Section 3.2. Multiple regression is replicated for 
simulation runs in each group (see Table 10). 
As NASDAQ and NYSE are different in market structure, I expect there is difference 
between b coefficients using the two different groups. Not surprisingly, the results show 
that 1) estimation using both samples get b coefficient over 0.4, and 2) b estimate in 
NASDAQ group shows a larger value of 0.47 and that in NYSE & AMEX group is close 
to 0.42. Possible explanation could be that NASDAQ stocks are traded by a large number 
of market venues and have a higher degree of order flow fragmentation than NYSE, 
which reduce the market quality and price efficiency (Bennett & Wei, 2006). 
Nevertheless, with the slight difference involved in the regression result from two groups 
divided by stock exchange, previous conclusion will not be changed. 
 
5.4. Substitution Effect 
As we know, the firm-date combination in random simulations discussed above is 
constructed by a firm portfolio with very few limitations on the fitness to M&A target 
firms. Thus, if we intend to have a better understanding of the unconditional scenario 
constructed only by M&A target firms, a simulation using target firms combined with 
random calendar days will be of interest. On the other hand, a subsample exclude firms 
that become targets within the successive year of the pseudo event day could be used to
                                                             
5The 4th merger wave is from 1981 to 1989; the 5th merger wave is from 1994 to 2001. During these two 
decades, there are two recessions, early 1980s recession (1980 – 1982) and dot-com recession (2002 and 
2003 in the United States). 
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Table 9. Regression Results of M&A Sample Comparison Between Three Studies 
  This Paper Schwert (1996) Betton, Eckbo &Thorburn (2008) 
Sample Time Period 1990-2012 1975-1991 1980-2002 
Stock Exchange NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ NYSE, AMEX All US publicly traded Targets 
Sample Size 4366 1814 7522 
Regression Model Markup𝑖 =  a +  b Runup𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 Premium𝑖 =  a +  b Runup𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  Markup𝑖 =  a +  b Runup𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖  
Intercept 0.1913 0.0840 -0.0660 
 (29.4757***) (8.3400***) (-6.9900***) 
CAR [-42,-1] 0.1753 0.13006 0.5950 
  (for b=0, 6.8376***) (for b=1, 2.88**) 
(for b=1, 71.33***), (for b=0, 
26.64***) 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1]; Mark-ups are 
estimated over day [0, +126 or delisting day]; 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-




Table 10. Different Exchange Group Regression Results 
Pure Random represent regression coefficients from simulation sample, which average coefficients across 10,000 
runs. % T Sig. shows percentage of t-statistics derived from regression in each run that are significant at 5% level. T-
stat (H0: Mu=0) displays results of t-test examining with null hypothesis H0: Mu=0.  Note that population std. 
deviation is used while calculating T-stat (H0: Mu=0), simply times them by √𝑁=100 to get t-stats using sample std. 
deviation.  T-stat (H0: MuNYSE&AMEX=MuNASDAQ) presents results from two-sample t-test with a null hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference between coefficient mean in NYSE&AMEX sample and that in NASDAQ sample. 














 NYSE & AMEX 
Intercept 10000 0.0986    0.0183 0.1782 
  (2.4180) 65.40 (2.04*) (-91.23***)   
CAR [-42,-1] 10000 0.4170    0.3128 0.522 
  (13.6512) 100 (6.43***) (-20.89***)   
Size 10000 -0.0092    -0.0140 -0.0042 
  (-3.2695) 89.02 (-3.07**) (32.49***)   
Industry 10000 0.0001    -0.000 0.0000 
   (0.5017) 11.50 (0.44) (-0.83)   
  NASDAQ 
Intercept 10000 0.3385    0.2293 0.4485 
  (5.1786) 99.97 (5.07***) n/a   
CAR [-42,-1] 10000 0.4723    0.3724 0.5856 
  (15.1600) 100 (7.17***) n/a   
Size 10000 -0.0325    -0.041 -0.0241 
  (-6.2350) 89.12 (-6.33***) n/a   
Industry 10000 0.0003    -0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.6466) 11.29 (0.61)  n/a   
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1]; Mark-ups 
are estimated over day [0, +126 or delisting day]; 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using 
a two-tail test. 
                                                             
6 Schwert (1996) got 1.13 using the model cited in his study, 0.13 is the b estimate after adjustment via 
Equation (4) cited in Section 5 of this paper. 
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testify the run-up and mark-up relation under a scenario without M&A event effects. 
However, due to the small fraction of real M&A target-date combinations (4,171 real 
M&A target-date combinations out of 46,718,352 firm-date combinations in the 
simulation pool), the change of the estimated relation between run-ups and mark-ups is 
expected to be negligible. Therefore, the subsample of random target-date combinations 
will be the choice of my investigation to further study the new baseline of relation 
between run-ups and mark-ups. 
The subsample is constructed by combining target firm in M&A sample and all the 
calendar day between Jan 1st 1990 to Dec 31st 2012 one by one. With 4,171 target firms 
and 8,401 calendar days, the random target-date portfolio includes 35,040,571 
observations. Pure random simulation and time stratified random simulation approaches 
have been conducted using this portfolio, resulting in 2 simulation subsamples with 
10,000 runs (follow the same approach in Section 3.2). Since this subsample uses real 
target firms and contains M&A event effects, I expect the estimated relation of interest to 
be reduced if the new baseline established in the previous sections is robust. Additionally, 
the b estimate in time stratified random simulation should be even smaller as this 
subsample includes more time concentration effect of M&A deals. 
Single-factor and multiple regressions have be conducted for both simulation subsamples. 
Regression results are displayed in Table 11. As expected, the results have shown a good 
agreement with my previous findings, indicating substitution hypothesis might outweigh 
mark-up pricing hypothesis. That is to say, the average b estimate decreases to a 
significant 0.45 for pure random simulation sample (0.43 for time stratified random 
simulation sample) under both single-factor and multiple regressions. This reduced b 
coefficient is consistent with my expectation that the relation between real run-ups and 
mark-ups are smaller in magnitude than that between two random CARs under the 
normal scenario. 
Moreover, we could observe from Table 12 that even b estimate at the 1st percentile of 
the empirical distribution (derived from the four subsamples) is much larger than that of 




Table 11. Regression Results for Target Firm with Random Date Simulation 
% T Sig. shows percentage of t-statistics derived from regression in each run that are significant at 5% level. T-stat (H0: 
Mu=0) displays results of t-test examining with null hypothesis H0: Mu=0.  Note that population std. deviation is used 
while calculating T-stat (H0: Mu=0), simply times them by √𝑁=100 to get t-stats using sample std. deviation. 















Intercept 10000 -0.0003     0.0076     
  (-0.0452) 4.6 (-0.0434) (1.1008) 19.31 (1.1127) 
CAR [-42,-1] 10000 0.4520   0.4304   
  (14.9758) 100 (9.5313***) (14.2711) 100 (8.9803***) 
Multiple Regression 
Intercept 10000 0.0107   0.0125   
  (0.1824) 5.24 (0.1817) (0.2098) 6.1 (0.2064) 
CAR [-42,-1] 10000 0.4521   0.4304   
  (14.9724) 100 (9.5296***) (14.2657) 100 (8.9758***) 
Size 10000 -0.0009   -0.0001   
  (-0.2072) 5.31 (-0.2100) (-0.0302) 4.98 (-0.0311) 
Stock 
Exchange 
10000 0.0007   -0.0046   
  (0.0426) 4.7 (0.0428) (-0.2790) 4.87 (-0.2898) 
Industry 10000 0.0000   0.0000   
    (0.0303) 6.6 (0.0291) (-0.0784) 6.46 (-0.0735) 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using 
a two-tail test.  
 
Table 12. b Estimates Distribution at Different Percentiles (Target-Random Date Subsample) 
 Single Factor Regression Multiple Regression 






1 0.3393 0.3189 0.3394 0.3190 
5 0.3739 0.3512 0.3740 0.3511 
10 0.3917 0.3694 0.3918 0.3694 
25 0.4205 0.3983 0.4205 0.3983 
50 0.4522 0.4306 0.4523 0.4305 
75 0.4838 0.4624 0.4839 0.4624 
90 0.5128 0.4922 0.5131 0.4923 
95 0.5304 0.5078 0.5303 0.5080 
99 0.5603 0.5411 0.5607 0.5413 




However, due to the inadequate empirical tests and the dispersions with previous studies, 
it is not clear which hypothesis gains more support for sure. In fact, the development of 
the two hypotheses could have certain constrains, for instance, improper expectation of 
the b estimate range as [-1, 0]. Facing an empirical b estimate of 0.46 under the normal 
scenario and a b estimate of 0.45 under target firm normal scenario, it is critical to 
reconsider the design of the hypothesis itself. 
Interpretation of the finding that the run-up and mark-up relation is higher under normal 
scenario than that under M&A scenario could be the return reversal after the M&A 
announcement. As target stock price usually soars short before and on the announcement 
day, and drops back to a level where we could only have a slightly positive excess return 
(which is rather small in magnitude), real target run-ups and mark-ups tend to show a 
weaker positive relationship instead of a strong positive relation between two simulation 
CARs under the normal scenario, which is likely caused by the momentum effect in stock 
price. 
To sum up, although we have drawn valuable inferences from the empirical b estimates 
in random simulation regressions, the conclusion still remains open for future discussion. 
 
6. Robustness test  
Since this study investigates relation between successive abnormal returns for a certain 
firm, serial correlation is the first problem that we should bring to the table. Hence, 
following Betton et al. (Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, & Thorburn, 2014), serial correlation 
test is conducted by first sorting the dataset according to the magnitude of run-ups, then 
complete Durbin-Watson (Durbin & Watson, 1950) test for residuals of the regression.  
I choose the 5000th run from each simulations as the testing samples, namely pure 
random single-factor sample, pure random multiple sample, time stratified random 
single-factor sample and time stratified random multiple sample. Similarly, White test for 
heteroscadastisity (White, 1980) and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are examined for 
each testing sample where applicable. 
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According to the results in Table 14 (in Appendix), Durbin-Watson estimates are very 
close to two with p-values larger than 0.1, thus there is no strong evidence for serial 
correlation; VIF value around 1.0 in multiple regression indicates a fair performance as 
related to multicolinearity issue. Nevertheless, both single-factor and multiple regression 
models have variables that fail to pass White Test for heteroskedasticity. Therefore, the 
only issue that we should pay attention to is the heteroskedasticity problem which 
involves in OLS regression model for both M&A and simulation samples.  
To resolve this problem, weighted least square regressions have been conducted for both 
simulation samples (pure random and time stratified random) and M&A sample using 
single factor model (Equation 4) in Section 5.1. Not surprisingly, after correcting 
heteroskedasticity problem, the magnitude of b estimates for all three samples has 
slightly decreased. This slight decrease, however, does not cause any substantial change 
for discussions in previous sections. Detailed results of the WLS regression can be found 
in Table 15 in the Appendix. 
It is consistent with the conclusion that, during the M&A process, substitution hypothesis 
tends to overweigh mark-up pricing hypothesis, and the conclusion is still open for 
further discussion. If substitution hypothesis gains the upper hand, it will provide more 
support for the rational two-party bargaining scenario where there are more private 
information involved in the decision of both sides than that have been reflected in the 
open market. More specifically, it consists with the semi-strong form efficient market 
hypothesis, suggesting that the market price reflects all the public information and the 
two parties are therefore confidently playing with their private information regardless of 
the run-ups in target stock price. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Following previous studies on relation between target pre-bid run-ups and post-bid mark-
ups, this paper examine that relation under the normal scenario using large sample 
simulations. Sampled firms are exchange-listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ over a 
period of 1990 to 2012. Cross-sectional event study has been conducted for each 
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combination of random selected date and sampled firm. Simulation methods include 
simple random selection and time stratified random selection which assigns different 
weights to each time period according to the real M&A concentration over time.  
Interested in answering the question of how big the pre-bid run-ups are, I study the 
empirical distribution of run-ups from the simulation samples. As comparing to a pre-bid 
CAR of -0.3463 at 5th percentile (i.e. -0.3555 for time stratified simulation) and 0.3172 at 
95th percentile (i.e. 0.3266 for time stratified simulation) from the empirical run-up 
distribution, only 13% of M&A run-ups in this study could be recognized as abnormal at 
10% significance level. The usage of empirical simulation run-up distribution as a new 
benchmark casts doubts on the traditional way to distinguish whether pre-bid run-ups are 
of great importance.  
While examining the relation between run-ups and mark-ups via OLS regression model, 
an unexpected b coefficient using simulation sample has been reported by the results. An 
average b coefficient of 0.46 contradicts the hypothesized range of [-1, 0] for this 
coefficient, and then establishes a reasonable baseline to test substitution/mark-up pricing 
hypothesis. To be more specific, we expect a b coefficient that is larger than the baseline 
of 0.46 under mark-up pricing hypothesis and vice versa. Contrary to Schwert (1996), it 
is believed that his findings, as well as findings in this paper, provide more support to 
substitution hypothesis, the design of the two competing hypotheses are in need of 
modification though. This finding shows an agreement with the momentum effect 
documented in the literature, and the reversal of target stock price after M&A 
announcement could also be a possible explanation for the weaker relationship between 
real M&A pre-bid run-ups and post-bid mark-ups. 
To summarize, in order to better understand pre-bid run-ups and the relation between run-
ups and mark-ups, this study provides valuable inferences drawn from empirical 
investigation under a normal scenario via large sample simulation. Nevertheless, there are 
certain limitations involved: 1) empirical tests are in need to further examine findings in 
this paper, and 2) it is possible that the research methodology applied in this paper causes 
certain impacts on the study results.  Therefore, future study is in need to further testify 
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Table 13. Time Weight Across M&A Sample Period 
Year Count % 
1990 14 0.34% 
1991 19 0.46% 
1992 28 0.67% 
1993 52 1.25% 
1994 115 2.76% 
1995 151 3.62% 
1996 193 4.63% 
1997 276 6.62% 
1998 318 7.62% 
1999 428 10.26% 
2000 330 7.91% 
2001 235 5.63% 
2002 143 3.43% 
2003 164 3.93% 
2004 191 4.58% 
2005 212 5.08% 
2006 258 6.19% 
2007 288 6.90% 
2008 167 4.00% 
2009 101 2.42% 
2010 172 4.12% 
2011 165 3.96% 
2012 151 3.62% 





Table 14. Diagnostic Tests for Regression Model 
 Heteroscedasticity Serial Correlation Multicolinearity 
  White Test  Durbin-Watson D Pr<DW Pr>DW 1st Order Autocorrelation VIF 
M&A Sample Single Factor Regression 
Intercept <.0001 2.0330 0.8564 0.1436 -0.0170 N/A 
CAR [-42,-1] <.0001     N/A 
M&A Sample Multiple Regression 
Intercept <.0001 1.982 0.2789 0.7211 0.009 0.0000 
CAR [-42,-1] <.0001     1.0173 
Size <.0001     1.3520 
Stock Exchange 0.4304     1.3357 
Industry 0.0022     1.0126 
5000th Pure Random Sample Single Factor Regression 
Intercept <.0001 1.9800 0.2512 0.7488 0.0080 N/A 
CAR [-42,-1] <.0001     N/A 
5000th Time Stratified Random Sample Single Factor Regression 
Intercept 0.0420 1.9860 0.3151 0.6849 -0.0020 N/A 
CAR [-42,-1] <.0001     N/A 
5000th Pure Random Sample Multiple Regression 
Intercept 0.0030 2.011 0.6413 0.3587 -0.0060 0.0000 
CAR [-42,-1] <.0001     1.0032 
Size <.0001     1.1204 
Stock Exchange 0.0040     1.1145 
Industry 0.7680         1.0033 
5000th Time Stratified Random Sample Multiple Regression 
Intercept <.0001 1.9860 0.3164 0.6836 -0.0020 0.0000 
CAR [-42,-1] <.0001     1.0038 
Size <.0001     1.1455 
Stock Exchange 0.0106     1.1378 




Table 15. Single Factor WLS Regression Results 
  N 
Pure Random 
(5000th run) 
Obs at 5th 
Percentile 






Obs at 5th 
Percentile 
Obs at 95th 
Percentile 
Simulation Runs 
Intercept 10000 -0.0068 -0.0130 -0.0013 -4.4426 -0.0142 -0.0022 
  (-2.4034*) (-4.4426***) (-0.5399) (-2.7226**) (-4.6912***) (-0.9408) 
CAR [-42,-1] 10000 0.3229 0.2337 0.4070 0.3356 0.2496 0.4200 
    (10.8088***) (7.7647***) (13.5106***) (10.8907***) (8.0334***) (13.4952***) 
M&A Sample 
Intercept 4171 0.1696 n/a n/a    
  (35.4131***)      
CAR [-42,-1] 4171 0.0695 n/a n/a    
    (2.4979*)           
          T Test for Null Hypothesis: Mu0=0 
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using 
a two-tail test. 
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Table 16 Pseudo vs. Real Target Pre-bid Run-ups at All Percentiles 
M&A, Pure Random, and Time Stratified Random list the CARs from each sample at 100 percentiles. T-stat (H0: M&A CAR=0) displays the t-statistics for t-test with null hypothesis 
of 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 = 0 for M&A CAR at each percentile. vs 5th (95th) Percentile  of Simulation compares M&A CAR at selected percentile with average simulation CAR at 5
th (95th) 
percentile if M&A CAR has a negative sign (positive sign). <% 5th or > % 95th Pure Random denotes the proportion of 10,000 simulation CARs at 5th percentile that are larger than 
M&A CAR at selected percentile, or proportion of 10,000 simulation CARs at 95th percentile that are smaller than M&A CAR at selected percentile. T-stat (H0: Simu 5th (95th) > 
M&A) denotes the t-statistics from t-tests with null hypothesis of 𝐻0: 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 5
𝑡ℎ(95𝑡ℎ)𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢 > 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴, where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 < 0 (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑀&𝐴 > 0), standard deviation used for tests 
involving with average simulation 5th CAR is 𝜎 = √
1
10,000
∑ (𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢 𝑃𝑐𝑡5𝑖 − 𝜇)2
10,000





𝑖=1 . Same formula applies when calculating standard 
deviation used for tests with average simulation 95th CAR.  Note that population std. deviation is used while calculating T-stat (H0: Simu 5th (95th) > M&A), simply times them by 






vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 




vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 






pct1 -0.5360 -142.96*** -0.6436 < 100.00 6.4036*** -0.6661 < 100.00 5.6624*** 
pct2 -0.4315 -115.08*** -0.5098 < 63.33 4.2944*** -0.5260 < 100.00 3.6386*** 
pct3 -0.3499 -93.33*** -0.4366 < 0.37 0.2324 -0.4485 > 32.24 -0.3371 
pct4 -0.2983 -79.57*** -0.3851 > 0.00 -3.7138 -0.3960 > 0.00 -4.0886 
pct5 -0.2633 -70.24*** -0.3463 > 0.00 -7.4409 -0.3555 > 0.00 -7.7163 
pct6 -0.2367 -63.13*** -0.3162 > 0.00 -11.0993 -0.3235 > 0.00 -11.2451 
pct7 -0.2179 -58.12*** -0.2906 > 0.00 -14.4189 -0.2976 > 0.00 -14.3557 
pct8 -0.1986 -52.96*** -0.2689 > 0.00 -18.2104 -0.2751 > 0.00 -17.9524 
pct9 -0.1851 -49.38*** -0.2505 > 0.00 -21.3523 -0.2556 > 0.00 -21.1415 
pct10 -0.1710 -45.60*** -0.2338 > 0.00 -25.0097 -0.2384 > 0.00 -24.8557 
pct11 -0.1582 -42.20*** -0.2190 > 0.00 -28.6822 -0.2234 > 0.00 -28.3140 
pct12 -0.1452 -38.72*** -0.2059 > 0.00 -32.6118 -0.2096 > 0.00 -31.9738 
pct13 -0.1323 -35.28*** -0.1936 > 0.00 -36.6321 -0.1970 > 0.00 -35.9337 
pct14 -0.1220 -32.55*** -0.1825 > 0.00 -40.4740 -0.1858 > 0.00 -39.6353 
pct15 -0.1152 -30.72*** -0.1724 > 0.00 -43.6751 -0.1751 > 0.00 -43.1712 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1] 










vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 




vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 5th 
(95th) > M&A) 
pct16 -0.1048 -27.96*** -0.1629 > 0.00 -47.7912 -0.1653 > 0.00 -47.4127 
pct17 -0.0981 -26.18*** -0.1541 > 0.00 -51.4031 -0.1563 > 0.00 -51.2531 
pct18 -0.0923 -24.61*** -0.1460 > 0.00 -55.1661 -0.1480 > 0.00 -54.9236 
pct19 -0.0863 -23.01*** -0.1382 > 0.00 -58.9068 -0.1400 > 0.00 -58.6080 
pct20 -0.0804 -21.44*** -0.1309 > 0.00 -62.4764 -0.1325 > 0.00 -62.0427 
pct21 -0.0740 -19.74*** -0.1242 > 0.00 -66.2287 -0.1256 > 0.00 -65.5589 
pct22 -0.0681 -18.17*** -0.1176 > 0.00 -70.5447 -0.1190 > 0.00 -69.7203 
pct23 -0.0636 -16.97*** -0.1114 > 0.00 -74.4637 -0.1126 > 0.00 -73.6528 
pct24 -0.0575 -15.32*** -0.1056 > 0.00 -78.5429 -0.1066 > 0.00 -77.6079 
pct25 -0.0537 -14.32*** -0.1000 > 0.00 -82.4102 -0.1010 > 0.00 -81.2900 
pct26 -0.0489 -13.03*** -0.0946 > 0.00 -86.3954 -0.0955 > 0.00 -85.3191 
pct27 -0.0430 -11.47*** -0.0896 > 0.00 -90.6725 -0.0903 > 0.00 -89.5477 
pct28 -0.0385 -10.27*** -0.0847 > 0.00 -95.0526 -0.0854 > 0.00 -93.5136 
pct29 -0.0342 -9.13*** -0.0799 > 0.00 -99.2219 -0.0805 > 0.00 -97.8531 
pct30 -0.0293 -7.81*** -0.0754 > 0.00 -102.8317 -0.0759 > 0.00 -102.2696 
pct31 -0.0256 -6.83*** -0.0710 < 0.00 -106.7527 -0.0714 > 0.00 -106.4791 
pct32 -0.0211 -5.62*** -0.0667 < 0.00 -111.0701 -0.0672 > 0.00 -110.4302 
pct33 -0.0164 -4.39*** -0.0627 < 0.00 -115.5017 -0.0630 > 0.00 -115.1530 
pct34 -0.0130 -3.47*** -0.0587 < 0.00 -119.8096 -0.0590 > 0.00 -119.0158 
pct35 -0.0088 -2.34* -0.0548 < 0.00 -124.3332 -0.0552 > 0.00 -123.2741 
pct36 -0.0054 -1.45 -0.0511 < 0.00 -128.0818 -0.0514 > 0.00 -127.0464 
pct37 -0.0011 -0.30 -0.0475 < 0.00 -132.2498 -0.0477 > 0.00 -131.1365 
pct38 0.0034 0.91 -0.0439 < 0.00 -136.7123 -0.0441 < 0.00 -134.9314 
pct39 0.0060 1.59 -0.0405 < 0.00 -141.1300 -0.0406 < 0.00 -139.0221 
pct40 0.0088 2.34* -0.0371 < 0.00 125.3989 -0.0372 < 0.00 124.3009 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1] 








vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 




vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 5th 
(95th) > M&A) 
pct41 0.0138 3.69*** -0.0337 < 0.00 125.6515 -0.0338 < 0.00 125.0600 
pct42 0.0171 4.55*** -0.0305 < 0.00 127.1296 -0.0306 < 0.00 126.1017 
pct43 0.0218 5.82*** -0.0273 < 0.00 127.8305 -0.0274 < 0.00 126.5033 
pct44 0.0258 6.88*** -0.0242 < 0.00 127.9799 -0.0243 < 0.00 127.1626 
pct45 0.0297 7.92*** -0.0212 < 0.00 128.1632 -0.0213 < 0.00 127.5256 
pct46 0.0342 9.12*** -0.0182 < 0.00 128.0776 -0.0183 < 0.00 128.0169 
pct47 0.0383 10.21*** -0.0153 < 0.00 128.7231 -0.0153 < 0.00 128.8592 
pct48 0.0426 11.36*** -0.0124 < 0.00 128.6751 -0.0124 < 0.00 128.8491 
pct49 0.0469 12.50*** -0.0096 < 0.00 128.5172 -0.0096 < 0.00 129.0515 
pct50 0.0505 13.48*** -0.0069 < 0.00 128.6262 -0.0068 < 0.00 129.4243 
pct51 0.0541 14.43*** -0.0041 < 0.00 128.9783 -0.0040 < 0.00 129.8475 
pct52 0.0582 15.52*** -0.0014 < 0.00 128.6189 -0.0014 < 0.00 129.4623 
pct53 0.0617 16.45*** 0.0013 < 0.00 126.7519 0.0014 < 0.00 127.9080 
pct54 0.0670 17.88*** 0.0040 < 0.00 122.8006 0.0041 < 0.00 124.1996 
pct55 0.0713 19.02*** 0.0068 < 0.00 119.2104 0.0069 < 0.00 120.7557 
pct56 0.0753 20.08*** 0.0095 < 0.00 116.0755 0.0096 < 0.00 116.8415 
pct57 0.0805 21.46*** 0.0123 < 0.00 112.1548 0.0125 < 0.00 112.7503 
pct58 0.0845 22.53*** 0.0152 < 0.00 108.2549 0.0154 < 0.00 109.4499 
pct59 0.0899 23.97*** 0.0181 < 0.00 104.5191 0.0183 < 0.00 105.4382 
pct60 0.0951 25.35*** 0.0211 < 0.00 100.3534 0.0213 < 0.00 101.2549 
pct61 0.0991 26.44*** 0.0241 < 0.00 96.7865 0.0244 < 0.00 97.6273 
pct62 0.1041 27.77*** 0.0272 < 0.00 92.8270 0.0276 < 0.00 93.7617 
pct63 0.1084 28.91*** 0.0304 < 0.00 89.3105 0.0307 < 0.00 89.9130 
pct64 0.1139 30.37*** 0.0337 < 0.00 84.7889 0.0341 < 0.00 85.5269 
pct65 0.1202 32.05*** 0.0370 < 0.00 80.0183 0.0376 < 0.00 81.0345 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1] 








vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 5th 




vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 
5th (95th) > M&A) 
pct66 0.1249 33.33*** 0.0406 < 0.00 76.3282 0.0410 < 0.00 77.1231 
pct67 0.1313 35.02*** 0.0442 < 0.00 71.8593 0.0447 < 0.00 72.8219 
pct68 0.1363 36.37*** 0.0479 < 0.00 68.1647 0.0486 < 0.00 68.8516 
pct69 0.1424 37.99*** 0.0518 < 0.00 64.1033 0.0525 < 0.00 64.6572 
pct70 0.1492 39.81*** 0.0558 < 0.00 59.5741 0.0566 < 0.00 60.2363 
pct71 0.1574 41.97*** 0.0599 < 0.00 55.0447 0.0609 < 0.00 55.5989 
pct72 0.1652 44.07*** 0.0643 < 0.00 50.5782 0.0654 < 0.00 51.4276 
pct73 0.1726 46.04*** 0.0689 < 0.00 46.7873 0.0699 < 0.00 47.5751 
pct74 0.1788 47.69*** 0.0736 < 0.00 43.4874 0.0748 < 0.00 43.9894 
pct75 0.1866 49.77*** 0.0786 < 0.00 39.6067 0.0800 < 0.00 40.2725 
pct76 0.1943 51.81*** 0.0839 < 0.00 35.9654 0.0852 < 0.00 36.7388 
pct77 0.2011 53.64*** 0.0893 < 0.00 32.7748 0.0909 < 0.00 33.6409 
pct78 0.2111 56.31*** 0.0951 < 0.00 28.9763 0.0968 < 0.00 29.8827 
pct79 0.2207 58.86*** 0.1013 < 0.00 25.3666 0.1031 < 0.00 26.2899 
pct80 0.2302 61.41*** 0.1076 < 0.00 21.9150 0.1096 < 0.00 23.0128 
pct81 0.2384 63.59*** 0.1145 < 0.00 19.0270 0.1167 < 0.00 20.1727 
pct82 0.2476 66.05*** 0.1219 < 0.00 16.0680 0.1243 < 0.00 17.2840 
pct83 0.2593 69.17*** 0.1296 < 0.00 12.7375 0.1322 < 0.00 14.0250 
pct84 0.2687 71.68*** 0.1380 < 0.00 10.1940 0.1408 < 0.00 11.5307 
pct85 0.2802 74.74*** 0.1471 < 0.01 7.3842 0.1501 < 0.00 8.7748 
pct86 0.2942 78.48*** 0.1567 < 1.76 4.3416 0.1603 < 0.00 5.7767 
pct87 0.3085 82.29*** 0.1674 < 22.14 1.5494 0.1710 < 0.21 3.0655 
pct88 0.3201 85.38*** 0.1791 > 60.82 -0.4881 0.1831 < 5.88 1.0354 
pct89 0.3371 89.92*** 0.1918 > 95.88 -3.1205** 0.1965 > 29.64 -1.5541 
pct90 0.3525 94.01*** 0.2062 > 99.87 -5.1668*** 0.2111 > 81.49 -3.5608*** 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1] 









vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 5th 




vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile of 
Simulation 
<% 5th or > % 
95th Pure 
Random 
T-stat (H0: Simu 5th 
(95th) > M&A) 
pct91 0.3750 100.02*** 0.2225 > 100.00 -7.7886*** 0.2278 > 98.55 -6.1624*** 
pct92 0.4024 107.34*** 0.2405 > 100.00 -10.6327*** 0.2470 > 99.99 -8.9308*** 
pct93 0.4259 113.60*** 0.2618 > 100.00 -12.3362*** 0.2691 > 100.00 -10.6610*** 
pct94 0.4549 121.33*** 0.2872 > 100.00 -13.9277*** 0.2947 > 100.00 -12.3340*** 
pct95 0.4837 129.01*** 0.3172 > 100.00 -14.8066*** 0.3266 > 100.00 -13.3167*** 
pct96 0.5302 141.43*** 0.3559 > 100.00 -16.2447*** 0.3669 > 100.00 -14.7649*** 
pct97 0.5753 153.46*** 0.4079 > 100.00 -16.1813*** 0.4197 > 100.00 -14.7606*** 
pct98 0.6549 174.68*** 0.4833 > 100.00 -16.1437*** 0.5007 > 100.00 -14.6107*** 
pct99 0.7796 207.94*** 0.6265 > 100.00 -14.2537*** 0.6523 > 100.00 -12.9278*** 
pct100 2.2632 603.67*** 2.2418 > 100.00 -1.8344$ 2.4232 > 100.00 -1.6027 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1] 











vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile  of 
Simulation 1 
Std. Time Stratified 
Random 
vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile  of 
Simulation 2 
pct1 -1.7412 -2.1881 0.4469 < -2.1378 < 
pct2 -1.4016 -1.7330 0.3314 < -1.6883 < 
pct3 -1.1367 -1.4844 0.3477 > -1.4395 > 
pct4 -0.9692 -1.3090 0.3398 > -1.2712 > 
pct5 -0.8554 -1.1773 0.3219 > -1.1410 > 
pct6 -0.7688 -1.0749 0.3060 > -1.0384 > 
pct7 -0.7078 -0.9880 0.2802 > -0.9552 > 
pct8 -0.6450 -0.9141 0.2691 > -0.8831 > 
pct9 -0.6014 -0.8515 0.2501 > -0.8204 > 
pct10 -0.5554 -0.7949 0.2396 > -0.7652 > 
pct11 -0.5140 -0.7444 0.2304 > -0.7171 > 
pct12 -0.4716 -0.6999 0.2283 > -0.6726 > 
pct13 -0.4297 -0.6583 0.2286 > -0.6323 > 
pct14 -0.3965 -0.6203 0.2238 > -0.5962 > 
pct15 -0.3741 -0.5861 0.2120 > -0.5621 > 
pct16 -0.3406 -0.5538 0.2132 > -0.5307 > 
pct17 -0.3189 -0.5238 0.2049 > -0.5015 > 
pct18 -0.2998 -0.4963 0.1965 > -0.4750 > 
pct19 -0.2803 -0.4699 0.1896 > -0.4494 > 
pct20 -0.2611 -0.4451 0.1839 > -0.4254 > 
pct21 -0.2405 -0.4221 0.1816 > -0.4033 > 
pct22 -0.2212 -0.3998 0.1785 > -0.3818 > 
pct23 -0.2067 -0.3787 0.1720 > -0.3615 > 
pct24 -0.1866 -0.3591 0.1725 > -0.3422 > 
pct25 -0.1745 -0.3400 0.1655 > -0.3242 > 
pct26 -0.1588 -0.3218 0.1630 > -0.3067 > 
pct27 -0.1397 -0.3046 0.1649 > -0.2898 > 
pct28 -0.1251 -0.2878 0.1627 > -0.2740 > 
pct29 -0.1112 -0.2716 0.1604 > -0.2585 > 
pct30 -0.0952 -0.2564 0.1612 > -0.2436 > 
pct31 -0.1057 -0.2413 0.1356 > -0.2293 > 
pct32 -0.0870 -0.2268 0.1398 > -0.2157 > 
pct33 -0.0679 -0.2131 0.1452 > -0.2023 > 
pct34 -0.0537 -0.1995 0.1458 > -0.1893 > 
pct35 -0.0362 -0.1863 0.1502 > -0.1771 > 
pct36 -0.0224 -0.1738 0.1514 > -0.1649 > 
pct37 -0.0046 -0.1613 0.1567 > -0.1530 > 
pct38 0.0142 -0.1492 0.1633 < -0.1417 < 
pct39 0.0247 -0.1376 0.1623 < -0.1304 < 
pct40 0.0285 -0.1260 0.1545 < -0.1194 < 
pct41 0.0449 -0.1147 0.1596 < -0.1086 < 
pct42 0.0555 -0.1038 0.1593 < -0.0983 < 
pct43 0.0709 -0.0929 0.1638 < -0.0880 < 
pct44 0.0838 -0.0823 0.1662 < -0.0780 < 









vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile  of 
Simulation 1 
Std. Time Stratified 
Random 
vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile  of 
Simulation 2 
pct46 0.1111 -0.0619 0.1730 < -0.0586 < 
pct47 0.1243 -0.0519 0.1762 < -0.0491 < 
pct48 0.1383 -0.0423 0.1806 < -0.0398 < 
pct49 0.1522 -0.0326 0.1848 < -0.0308 < 
pct50 0.1642 -0.0233 0.1875 < -0.0218 < 
pct51 0.1758 -0.0139 0.1897 < -0.0129 < 
pct52 0.1890 -0.0046 0.1936 < -0.0043 < 
pct53 0.2004 0.0043 0.1960 < 0.0044 < 
pct54 0.2178 0.0136 0.2041 < 0.0132 < 
pct55 0.2316 0.0230 0.2086 < 0.0221 < 
pct56 0.2445 0.0323 0.2122 < 0.0309 < 
pct57 0.2614 0.0419 0.2194 < 0.0400 < 
pct58 0.2743 0.0517 0.2226 < 0.0494 < 
pct59 0.2919 0.0615 0.2305 < 0.0587 < 
pct60 0.3088 0.0717 0.2371 < 0.0684 < 
pct61 0.3220 0.0820 0.2400 < 0.0783 < 
pct62 0.3383 0.0924 0.2458 < 0.0885 < 
pct63 0.3521 0.1034 0.2487 < 0.0987 < 
pct64 0.3699 0.1146 0.2554 < 0.1094 < 
pct65 0.3904 0.1259 0.2645 < 0.1205 < 
pct66 0.4059 0.1379 0.2680 < 0.1318 < 
pct67 0.4265 0.1503 0.2763 < 0.1436 < 
pct68 0.4429 0.1627 0.2802 < 0.1559 < 
pct69 0.4626 0.1760 0.2866 < 0.1684 < 
pct70 0.4848 0.1898 0.2951 < 0.1817 < 
pct71 0.5112 0.2038 0.3074 < 0.1954 < 
pct72 0.5368 0.2187 0.3181 < 0.2098 < 
pct73 0.5607 0.2343 0.3264 < 0.2245 < 
pct74 0.5808 0.2502 0.3306 < 0.2402 < 
pct75 0.6062 0.2673 0.3389 < 0.2567 < 
pct76 0.6311 0.2852 0.3458 < 0.2735 < 
pct77 0.6534 0.3036 0.3497 < 0.2917 < 
pct78 0.6858 0.3234 0.3624 < 0.3108 < 
pct79 0.7168 0.3443 0.3726 < 0.3310 < 
pct80 0.7479 0.3659 0.3820 < 0.3519 < 
pct81 0.7745 0.3894 0.3851 < 0.3746 < 
pct82 0.8044 0.4144 0.3900 < 0.3989 < 
pct83 0.8425 0.4405 0.4020 < 0.4242 < 
pct84 0.8730 0.4692 0.4038 < 0.4520 < 
pct85 0.9102 0.5000 0.4102 < 0.4819 < 
pct86 0.9558 0.5326 0.4232 < 0.5144 < 
pct87 1.0022 0.5690 0.4332 < 0.5489 < 
pct88 1.0399 0.6089 0.4310 < 0.5877 < 
pct89 1.0952 0.6520 0.4432 > 0.6307 > 
pct90 1.1450 0.7010 0.4439 > 0.6774 > 









vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile  of 
Simulation 1 
Std. Time Stratified 
Random 
vs 5th (95th) 
Percentile  of 
Simulation 2 
pct92 1.3074 0.8176 0.4898 > 0.7927 > 
pct93 1.3835 0.8901 0.4935 > 0.8638 > 
pct94 1.4778 0.9763 0.5015 > 0.9458 > 
pct95 1.5712 1.0784 0.4929 > 1.0484 > 
pct96 1.7225 1.2101 0.5124 > 1.1776 > 
pct97 1.8690 1.3867 0.4823 > 1.3470 > 
pct98 2.1275 1.6431 0.4843 > 1.6071 > 
pct99 2.5326 2.1299 0.4027 > 2.0937 > 
pct100 7.3523 7.6212 -0.2689 > 7.7777 > 
Run-ups are estimated over an estimation window of day [-297, -43], and an event window of day [-42,-1]; 
Difference denotes the difference between Std. M&A and Std. Pure Random. 
 
